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DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY IN ILLINOIS-A REALISTIC
APPROACH
ANTHONY J. Fusco, JR.
NANCY B. COLLINS
JULIAN R. BIRNBAUM*
In the 1972 landmark case of Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, I the Illi-
nois Supreme Court abandoned the ancient common law rule absolv-
ing a landlord of any obligation to maintain 2 or repair 3 residential
premises, and recognized the existence of an implied warranty of habit-
ability in all residential leases. 4 This implied warranty imposes a duty
upon the landlord of residential rental premises to substantially comply
with applicable municipal building code health and safety provisions.5
By abandoning feudal property law and viewing the residential land-
lord-tenant relationship essentially as one of contract, with correspond-
ing obligations on both parties, the Spring court gave to tenants' rights
advocates hope that, at long last, the courts could be utilized as an ef-
fective device to help achieve decent housing and fair treatment of te-
nants.
While Spring and its progeny6 have firmly established the implied
warranty in Illinois, the Spring doctrine generally has not been re-
ceived sympathetically in the trial courts.7 As documented by a recent
* Mr. Fusco, J.D. Valparaiso University School of Law, Ms. Collins, J.D. DePaul Univer-
sity School of Law, and Mr. Birnbaum, J.D. University of Chicago, are attorneys with The Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago, specializing in housing law. They have had extensive experi-
ence in a variety of housing law matters, including extensive practice in eviction court. The au-
thors wish to acknowledge Michael J. Crowley, Senior Law Student at the Illinois Institute of
Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law, who served as special research associate in the prepa-
ration of this article.
1. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
2. See Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Il. 569 (1902).
3. See Blake v. Ranous, 25 Ill. App. 486 (1888).
4. 50 111. 2d at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
5. Id., 280 N.E.2d at 217.
6. See Fisher v. Holt, 52 Ill. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370 (1977); Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 Ill.
App. 3d 985, 363 N.E.2d 626 (1977); South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89,
361 N.E.2d 795 (1977); Richardson v. Wilson, 46 111. App. 3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110 (1977); Gillette
v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
7. See Richardson v. Wilson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110 (1977); South Austin
Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 IIl. App. 3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1977). In the Circuit Court of
Cook County, despite clear precedent, trial courts have failed to enforce the implied warranty of
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two year study of Eviction Court in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, 8 breach of the implied warranty of habitability is the most
often alleged defense by tenants in eviction actions,9 yet the trial courts
repeatedly refuse to consider this defense or otherwise fail to reach the
merits of warranty claims.' 0
Several reasons may explain the trial courts' hostility to these
cases,"I including an overburdened caseload for judges hearing evic-
tions,12 the built-in conflict presented in such cases between human and
property interests,1 3 the long standing practice and role of Eviction
Court,' 4 and the lack of familiarity with the conditions of the housing
involved. 15 Beyond these reasons, an additional explanation for this
anomolous result may be the lack of standards and guidelines as to
how the court should determine the amount of damages suffered by the
tenant as a result of the breach of warranty.' 6 The complete lack of
habitability established in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). See
note 11 infra.
8. Judgment Landlord: A Study of Eviction Court in Chicago (J. Birnbaum, N. Collins, A.
Fusco, Jr., Coordinators, S. Mansfield, Editor, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Judgment Landlord].
This study, a joint project sponsored by The Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, The Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, Chicago Chapter and The Chicago Council of Lawyers, was released on
April 7, 1978.
9. Id. at 11-12, 42.
10. Id. at 44-45.
11. Data collected in Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, emphatically demonstrates that de-
spite clear Illinois law, tenants do not prevail on the merits of an implied warranty of habitability
defense in the Eviction Court in Chicago. Tenants raised implied warranty of habitability de-
fenses in 41.1% (179 of 435) of the contested cases, and these defenses constituted 29.1% (179 of
615) of the total number of defenses raised by tenants. Id. at 44. Despite the fact that the habita-
bility defense was the most frequently raised defense, no tenant prevailed on the merits of the
defense. On the other hand, landlords were awarded summary possession in 93.3% (167 of 179) of
these cases. Id. at 44-45. While 2.2% (4 of 179) of these cases were involuntarily dismissed, all of
the involuntary dismissals were based on other defenses, such as improper notice, rather than on
the merits of the habitability defense. Id. at 45. The remaining 4.5% (8 of 179) of these cases were
disposed of by other means. Id.
12. As noted in Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, at 1, in 1977, 64,748 lawsuits seeking evic-
tion orders were filed in the Cook County Circuit Court, First Municipal District (City of Chi-
cago) alone. Eviction actions constitute 26.6% of all suits filed in the First Municipal District, yet
only two courtrooms hear eviction cases in Chicago. Id. at 2. The total time devoted to eviction
cases in these courtrooms is approximately 3 1/2 hours per day during which time an average of
210 cases are set for call. Id. at 3. Data collected by observers indicated that the average amount
of time devoted by the court to a contested eviction was approximately two minutes. Id. at 9.
13. See Hon. Leonard Cohen, Urban Housing Court and Landlord-Tenant Justice.- National
Models and Expenses, Report of the ABA Special Committee on Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Law, at 26 (Sept. 1977).
14. See Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, at 114-21.
15. See Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results. A Study
of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 8, 63 (1973).
16. It is important to note that the promulgation of clear standards for the proper measure of
damages in implied warranty of habitability cases will not, in and of itself, resolve the problems
regarding the treatment of these cases in the Eviction Courts. These cases in particular and evic-
tion cases in general may no longer be treated as summary proceedings. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). Without substantial changes in the manner in which evic-
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clear standards for the Illinois courts makes the task of calculating and
proving with certainty the amount of damages in these cases a difficult
one. '
7
This article will address the problem created by the lack of clear
standards for determining the proper measure of damages for breach of
the implied warranty of habitability. The first portion of this article
will review the historical development of the implied warranty of habit-
ability in Illinois, analyzing Spring and its progeny. Second, this article
will discuss and critically evaluate the measures adopted in other j uris-
dictions for determining damages. Finally, the authors will propose a
new measure of damages for breach of the warranty of habitability in
Illinois-the loss of use to the tenant.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY IN ILLINOIS: JACK SPRING, INC. v LITTLE
AND ITS PROGENY
By adopting the implied warranty of habitability in Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little,18 the Illinois Supreme Court fundamentally changed its
view of the nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. The court
quoted extensively from the seminal opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Javins v. First National Re-
alty Corp.,19 and traced the old common law rule that a landlord has
no obligation to maintain or repair the premises to agrarian notions of
a lease as an interest in land.20 The court rejected these assumptions as
tion cases are presently handled, the promulgation of clear standards for the proper measure of
damages, as advanced in this article, will have little practical meaning. Necessary changes in-
clude, but are not limited to the following: (I) separate courtrooms should be established for the
trial of warranty of habitability cases and other complex fact cases; (2) judges assigned to hear
such cases should be specially trained; (3) comprehensive rules of practice and procedure for evic-
tion cases should be created; and (4) a trial manual for eviction judges should be developed.
These and a number of other reforms were proposed in Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, at 121-
30, and were substantially endorsed in the Report of the Chicago Bar Association Special Commit-
tee on Forcible Entry and Detainer Court, at 4-6. This latter report was released on June 21, 1978,
and copies are available from the Chicago Bar Association.
17. The absence of complete certainty of the amount of damages is not a bar to recovery in
Illinois. Illinois Power Co. v. Champaign Asphalt Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 74, 310 N.E.2d 463, 469
(1974); Tri-County Grain Terminal Co. v. Swift & Co., 118 Ill. App. 2d 313, 254 N.E.2d 311
(1969). The Illinois courts, in this regard, have adopted generally accepted principles of evidence.
See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 27 (1935); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1950 & Supp. 1971).
For a more detailed discussion, see text accompanying notes 100-03 infra.
18. 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
19. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
20. The davins court stated:
The common law rule absolving the lessor of all obligation to repair originated in the
early Middle Ages. Such a rule was perhaps well suited to an agrarian economy; the
land was more important than whatever small living structure was included in the lease-
hold, and the tenant farmer was fully capable of making repairs himself. These histori-
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inapplicable to contemporary housing patterns, 2' and held that "in-
cluded in the contracts, both oral and written, governing the tenancies
of the defendants in the multiple unit dwellings occupied by them is an
implied warranty of habitability which is fulfilled by substantial com-
pliance with the pertinent provisions of the Chicago Building Code. ' 22
For the first time,23 the court imposed upon the landlord-tenant rela-
cal facts were the basis on which the common law constructed its rule; they also provided
the necessary prerequisites for its application.
Court decisions in the late 1800's began to recognize that the factual assumptions of
the common law were no longer accurate in some cases. For example, the common law,
since it assumed that the land was the most important part of the leasehold, required a
tenant to pay rent even if any building on the land was destroyed. Faced with such a
rule and the ludicrous results it produced, in 1863 the New York Court of Appeals de-
clined to hold that an upper story tenant was obliged to continue paying rent after his
apartment building burned down. The court simply pointed out that the urban tenant
had no interest in the land, only in the attached building.
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 363-64, 280 N.E.2d 208, 215-16 (1972) (quoting Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
21. Citing Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 349-50, 31 N.E. 286-87 (1892), and Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 426 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the court
noted:
[Slome courts began some time ago to question the common law's assumptions that the
land was the most important feature of a leasehold and that the tenant could feasibly
make any necessary repairs himself. Where those assumptions no longer reflect contem-
porary housing patterns, the courts have created exceptions to the general rule that land-
lords have no duty to keep their premises in repair ....
Our approach to the common law of landlord and tenant ought to be aided by
principles derived from the consumer protection cases referred to above. In a lease con-
tract, a tenant seeks to purchase from his landlord shelter for a specified period of time.
The landlord sells housing as a commercial businessman and has much greater opportu-
nity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain the condition of his building. More-
over, the tenant must rely upon the skill and bona fides of his landlord at least as much
as a car buyer must rely upon the car manufacturer. In dealing with major problems,
such as heating, plumbing, electrical or structural defects, the tenant's position corre-
sponds precisely with the ordinary consumer who cannot be expected to have the knowl-
edge or capacity or even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of mechanical
instrumentalities, like automobiles, and to decide for himself whether they are reason-
ably fit for the designed purpose.
Since a lease contract specifies a particular period of time during which the tenant
has a right to use his apartment for shelter, he may legitimately expect that the apart-
ment will be fit for habitation for the time period for which it is rented.
50 111. 2d at 364-65, 280 N.E.2d at 216 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217. The party asserting a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability must make out a two-step prima facie case. First, the party must prove the existence
of the conditions which give rise to a breach of the warranty during the relevant period of time.
This may be done by tenant or other testimony as to the actual conditions of the premises at issue.
See notes 117-21 infra and accompanying text. The party asserting breach also must prove that
there exists an implied warranty and that the premises by virtue of these defects are either not in
substantial compliance with the provisions of the applicable building code, or where no such code
exists, that habitability of the premises has been diminished.
Second, the party must prove damages. This requires evidence of the nature and severity of
the defects, their duration, their effect on safety, health and sanitation and how each interfered
with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises. See text accompanying notes 96-116 infra.
Once the prima facie case is presented, of course, the landlord may offer rebuttal evidence.
23. An implied warranty to comply with all local building code regulations was no stranger
to Illinois law prior to the Spring case. It had been long settled law that in contracts to purchase
real property there exists an implied warranty of compliance with the building code. See Schiro v.
W.E. Gould & Co., 18 111. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960) (and cases cited therein). However, not
until the Spring case was an analogy drawn to the landlord-tenant relationship.
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tionship an affirmative obligation for a landlord to repair and maintain
residential premises. 24
The Spring court explained the policy reasons underlying the
modem landlord's obligation:
Today's urban tenants, the vast majority of whom live in multiple
dwelling houses, are interested, not in the land, but solely in a house
suitable for occupation. Furthermore, today's city dweller usually
has a single, specialized skill unrelated to maintenance work; he is
unable to make repairs like the jack-of-all-trades' farmer who was
the common law's model of the lessee. Further, unlike his agrarian
predecessor who often remained on one piece of land for his entire
life, urban tenants today are more mobile than ever before. A ten-
ant's tenure in a specific apartment will not be sufficient to justify
efforts at repairs. In addition, the increasing complexity of today's
dwellings renders them much more difficult to repair than the struc-
tures of earlier times. In a multiple dwelling repair may require ac-
cess to equipment and areas in the control of the landlord. Low and
middle income tenants, even if they were interested in making re-
pairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for major repairs
since they have no long-term interest in the property.25
Applying the warranty doctrine to the particular facts of the case, 26
the Spring court held that breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity may be raised as an affirmative defense by a tenant in an eviction
action based upon non-payment of rent27 and that the breach of war-
ranty is germane to the question of whether the rent claimed by the
landlord was due and owing.28 The court held that the tenant was enti-
24. The implication of the Spring case for forcible detainer actions is that such cases, at least
to the extent that breach of warranty of habitability is alleged, may no longer be treated in sum-
mary fashion. The evidentiary requisites of establishing a prima facie case, see note 22 supra, and
the expanded interpretation of the germaneness requirement of section 5 of the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (1977), Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Il. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972), see note 28 infra, bring into play the same rules of procedure, evidence
and trial practice attendant to other civil actions.
25. 50 Ill. 2d at 364, 280 N.E.2d at 216 (quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)). The court went on to analogize this
obligation and the tenant's right to expect compliance with it to a consumer goods warranty.
26. The Spring case was a forcible detainer action for non-payment of rent. As an affirma-
tive defense to the landlord's action, defendant Little alleged that the landlord had promised to
make repairs, that there were many structural defects in the building, that the building department
had sued the owner to enforce the building code, that Little was unable to find other housing, and
that the Department of Public Aid was withholding rent payments for other welfare recipient
occupants of the building. 1d. at 353, 280 N.E.2d at 210.
27. Id. at 366, 280 N.E.2d at 217.
28. The Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, enacted in 1874, codified the common law,
providing that "matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the [eviction] proceedings shall
[not] be introduced." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 57 (1977). In 1937, section 5 was amended to allow a
claim for rent to be joined with a claim for possession. 1937 I11. Laws § i, at 611. Until the late
1960's, the Illinois appellate courts generally confirmed that there was only one defense germane
to the merits of an eviction suit for non-payment of rent: that the tenant had in fact paid the rent
claimed to be due and owing.
Early in this decade, the Illinois courts began to construe the germaneness limitation of the
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tied "to prove that damages suffered as the result of the plaintiffs'
breach of warranty equalled or exceeded the rent claimed to be due,"'2 9
and that the sole and decisive issue was "whether the tenants owe the
landlords rent which is due and remains unpaid. 30
While the Spring decision firmly established the warranty of habit-
ability in residential leases, it left for future resolution many questions
regarding applicability, scope and utilization of the new doctrine. 3'
Subsequent decisions of the Illinois appellate courts have addressed
some of these questions, including affirmative use of breach,32 notice to
the landlord, 33 applicability to a two-flat,34 waiver of warranty in a
lease provision 35 and applicability of warranty where the landlord does
not seek a money claim for rent.36 The Spring decision and its progeny
all share a common problem in that while they agree and affirm that "a
tenant may recoup for damages" 37 suffered as a result of a landlord's
breach of warranty, all are silent on the question of the measure of
damages to be applied once a breach has been established. Moreover,
all have failed to set forth any guidelines or standards as to how these
damages are to be calculated or proved by the tenant.38 This article
Act more broadly, first finding that the tenant could raise race discrimination and other equitable
defenses in an eviction action. Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970),
cert. denied & appeal dismissed sub nor. Burton v. American Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 401 U.S. 928
(1970); Marine Park Assoc. v. Johnson, 1 111. App. 3d 464, 274 N.E.2d 645 (1971). Spring further
altered Illinois law by establishing an implied warranty of habitability for leased residential prem-
ises, the breach of which was made a germane defense to evictions based upon non-payment of
rent. The Spring doctrine has been reaffirmed and expanded by the Illinois courts in many subse-
quent cases. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
The legislature established another important defense to eviction. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80,
§ 71 (1977) bars a landlord from terminating a tenant's lease in retaliation for a complaint to
authorities about building or health code violations. See Clore v. Fredman, 59 I11. 2d 20, 319
N.E.2d 18 (1974).
29. 50 I1. 2d at 359, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
30. Id., 280 N.E.2d at 213.
31. See Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New
Issues, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1444 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moskovitz] for an excellent general
discussion of the warranty doctrine.
32. Gillette v. Anderson, 4 11. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
33. Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 111. App. 3d 985, 363 N.E.2d 626 (1977).
34. South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1977).
35. Id.
36. Richardson v. Wilson, 46 111. App. 3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110 (1977).
37. 50 Ill. 2d at 359, 280 N.E.2d at 213.
38. Although breach of warranty may be raised in several ways, a uniform measure of dam-
ages applicable to all is necessary. If the landlord sues the tenant for eviction for non-payment of
rent, the tenant may defeat such claim by assertion of facts constituting a breach of the implied
warranty. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). The tenant may also
counterclaim for damages for breach, Fisher v. Holt, 52 111. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370 (1977), or
seek an order to repair the premises, South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89,
361 N.E.2d 795 (1977). The tenant also may sue affirmatively for compliance or damages, Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 111. App. 3d 985,
363 N.E.2d 626 (1977). Although the tenant remains liable to the landlord for the "rent so long as
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will focus on the problem of determining damages and offer a solu-
tion.39
While the Illinois decisions after Spring all concur that a tenant is
entitled to a set-off against rent for damages suffered due to breach of
the implied warranty, 40 or that the tenant may counterclaim, 4' or sue
affirmatively for damages, 42 none of these cases provide any standards
to assist the court in determining the "reasonable value" of the prem-
ises in their defective condition. 43 To resolve this problem one first
must consider the measures of damages applied by courts in other juris-
dictions.
the tenant retains possession of the premises," Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 367, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972), the liability for the premises is limited to "the reasonable value of her
possession" in the defective condition. South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89,
361 N.E.2d 795 (1977). No guidelines have been provided to determine this reasonable value.
See text accompanying note 43 infra. These cases have resolved certain issues related to proof of
breach of warranty claims: (a) notice to the landlord, (b) rent withholding, and (c) the dispositive
effect of proving damages for the breach.
39. It is not the intent of the authors to address the other problems raised or left unanswered
by the Spring court. It would appear, however, that the court's great reliance on the Chicago
Building Code, which proclaims itself "applicable to occupancy for residential purposes of any
building," Chicago Municipal Code § 78-11.1 (emphasis added), would make the doctrine appli-
cable to single-family dwellings and multi-unit apartments alike. No Illinois courts have yet ad-
dressed the issue, although several other jurisdictions, recognizing that all such buildings are
covered by housing codes and that tenants residing therein face the same hardships as other urban
apartment dwellers, have applied the doctrine to single family houses. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 427, 462 P.2d 470, 471 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 1972); Steele
v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 331, 521 P.2d 304, 306 (1974); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 26,
289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 591, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961). This result is logically sound and
consistent with the broad policy behind the warranty as a means of insuring effective code compli-
ance.
40. South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 111. App. 3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1977); Rich-
ardson v. Wilson, 46 I11. App. 3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110 (1977).
41. Fisher v. Holt, 52 Ill. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370 (1977), relying on Peoria Housing
Auth. v. Sanders, 54 Ill. 2d 478, 298 N.E.2d 173 (1973).
42. Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 Ill. App. 3d 985, 363 N.E.2d 626 (1977). See also Gillette v. An-
derson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
43. The Illinois appellate courts have been presented with several opportunities to address
the question of the proper measure of damages, but in each instance they have failed to reach the
issue. In Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972), the Appellate Court of
Illinois for the Second District reversed a lower court order striking a complaint seeking damages
for breach of the implied warranty for failure to state a claim. The complaint had alleged dam-
ages of $60 per month for each month since inception of the tenancy. The court reversed the trial
court without comment as to the amount of damages.
In Fisher v. Holt, 52 Ill. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370 (1977), a forcible detainer action
wherein the defendant counterclaimed for $1125 in damages for breach of warranty, the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the First District reversed the trial court's dismissal of the counterclaim.
However, the appellate court limited its discussion to whether the counterclaim was procedurally
and substantively adequate. Finding it adequate, the court reversed without comment as to the
amount of damages from the breach.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
MEASURES OF DAMAGES ADOPTED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although the warranty of habitability has been recognized by j udi-
cial decision or statute in thirty-nine states," the question of the proper
measure of damages generally has been ignored. Illinois is not alone in
failing to provide standards for the determination of damages upon
proof of breach. Those jurisdictions that have addressed the question
of the proper measure of damages may be categorized under two ap-
proaches: the market value theory45 and the percentage reduction of
use theory.46 The objective of both theories is to establish the reason-
44. (Alaska) ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03, 34.03.160, 34.03.180 (1974); (Arizona) ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1324, 33-1361 (1974); (California) CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1974);
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); (Connecticut)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 24-47 (1960); Todd v. May, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 731, 316 A.2d 793
(1973); (Delaware) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5503 (1974); (District of Columbia) Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); (Florida)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51, 83.56 (Supp. 1977); (Georgia) GA. CODE ANN., tit. 61, ch. 111-12
(Cum. Supp. 1976); Givens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309, 190 S.E.2d 607 (1972); Stack v. Harris, I II
Ga. 149 (1906); (Hawaii) HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-42 (Supp. 1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); (Idaho) IDAHO CODE § 6-316 (1977); (Illinois) Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); (Iowa) Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); (Kansas)
Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); (Kentucky) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.595,
383.625 (Baldwin Supp. 1974); (Maine) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1974); (Mary-
land) MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (Cum. Supp. 1975), superceded in their respective
jurisdictions by Baltimore City Public Local Laws, §§ 9-9, 9-10, 9-14.1 (eff. July 1, 1971), and
Montgomery County Code, Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations, ch. 93A (Nov. 21, 1972); (Massachu-
setts) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (West Supp. 1974); Boston Housing Auth. v. Heming-
way, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. App. 1973); (Michigan) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (Supp.
1974); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); (Minnesota) MINN. STAT.
§ 504.18 (1974), applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); (Missouri)
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); (Nebraska) NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1419, 76-
1425 (Cum. Supp. 1974); (Nevada) NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 10, ch. I18A, §§ 290, 360 (1977); (New
Hampshire) Kline v. Bums, Ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); (New Jersey) Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); (New Mexico) N.M. STAT. § 70-7-1 (1975); (New York) N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1975); (North Carolina) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1977);
(North Dakota) N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1977); (Ohio) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04,
5321.07 (Page Supp. 1974); (Oregon) OR. REV. STAT. §§ 91.770, 91.800-815 (1974); (Pennsylvania)
Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974) (Interpretation
and application of this case are presently subject to controversy in Pennsylvania. But see Pugh v.
Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 1978), which recognizes common law warranty of habitability
at the superior court level. Appeal is pending.); (Rhode Island) R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 34-18-16
(1968); (Tennessee) TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-5501 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (applies to major cities only);
(Texas) Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); (Vermont) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 4859 (1972); (Virginia) VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.13, 55-248.25 (Cum. Supp. 1975); (Washing-
ton) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1974), enacted after judicial implication of war-
ranty of habitability in Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); (West Virginia)
H.B. 1368 (passed March 11, 1978; effective date, June 11, 1978) (sets out landlord obligation but
does not provide remedy for breach); (Wisconsin) Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961); but see Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970), Michalek v.
LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977).
45. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
46. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 639 n.24, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183 n.24, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977); Housing Auth. v. Scott,
137 NJ. Super. 110, 348 A.2d 195 (1975); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super.
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able rental value of the premises in their defective condition. Thus,
both theories are variations on the same theme-difference in value.
The market value theory, prevalent in earlier warranty of habita-
bility cases, is "measured by the difference between the fair rental value
of the premises if they had been as warranteed and the fair rental value
of the premises as they were during occupancy by the tenant in the
unsafe or unsanitary condition. '47 The theoretical and practical diffi-
culties of applying the market value theory48 explain the trend in an
increasing number of jurisdictions to adopt the percentage reduction of
use approach,49 which attempts to measure the actual loss suffered by
the tenant. This approach is described in the leading case of McKenna
v. Begin.50 In that case the court stated:
[The tenant's] rent is to be reduced by a percentage reflecting the
diminution in the value of the use and enjoyment of the leased prem-
ises by reason of the existence of defects which gave rise to the
breach of warranty of habitability.
Pursuing this method, the trial court on remand is to assess the
major code violations and determine the percentage by which the use
and enjoyment of the apartment has been diminished by the exist-
ence of those violations. The Court is to determine the percentage
reduction factor applicable to each major violation, total the percent-
ages to arrive at an aggregate percentage reduction factor, and then
assess as damages that percentage of [the tenant's] weekly rent for
each of the weeks during which the defects remained unrepaired. 51
Fair Market Value Approach
The fair market value theory originated in cases involving injury
to real property. This approach is appropriate for those areas of the
577, 338 A.2d 21 (1975); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Ill N.J. Super. 477, 485-86, 268 A.2d
556, 561-62 (1970); Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 62 App. Div. 2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1978); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973); Morbeth Realty
Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 335, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1971); Panos v. Cruz, No. 938-028
(County Ct. Milw. Co., Wis., Mar. 3, 1978). Other courts merely have assigned a monetary
amount to indicate the diminution. Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580
(1972); Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc.2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976); Steinberg
v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1973), rev'don other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972); Derr v. Gangemi,
No. 2310, Ct. of Common Pleas, Philadelphia (June 21, 1974).
47. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972). A slightly different formula applying
the same theory was utilized by a Massachusetts court in Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway,
293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. App. 1973). In that case the court stated, "The tenant's claim or counter-
claim for damages based upon this breach would be the difference between the value of the dwell-
ing as warranteed (the rent agreed on may be evidence of this value) and the value of the dwelling
as it exists in its defective condition." Id. at 845.
48. See text accompanying notes 52-76 infra.
49. See note 46 supra for cases adopting some form of percentage reduction.
50. 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977).
51. Id. at 552 (citations omitted).
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law for which it was created, notably eminent domain cases, because
the damage measured in those cases is the equity of the lessee in the
lease.5 2 However, in implied warranty cases, the damage measured is
the tenant's loss of use and enjoyment of the premises due to their dete-
riorated condition. Thus, the market value approach is not a fair meas-
ure of damages in the warranty context because it does not measure the
tenant's loss of use. 53 Furthermore, use of the market value approach
as a means to determine damages for breach of warranty is inconsistent
with the broad public policy of inducing code compliance, which is the
foundation for the implied warranty of habitability.
54
The Fair Market Value Theory Is Inconsistent with the Purpose of
Implied Warranty of Habitability
The fair market value theory is fundamentally inappropriate to
warranty of habitability cases because it measures damages by attempt-
ing to determine what price deteriorated housing (leased in violation of
the implied warranty and other applicable law) would bring when of-
fered on the open market. This theory is premised upon the fiction of a
willing lessor and lessee bargaining in a voluntary transaction, and its
52. People ex rel. Korzen v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 111. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 568 (1967).
See discussion therein at 571-72 concerning condemnation cases. The majority of these condem-
nation cases concern commercial matters. It is important to note that the commercial context is
inapposite to warranty of habitability since the warranty does not extend to commercial proper-
ties. See Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Jacoby, 23 Ill. App. 3d 145, 318 N.E.2d 734 (1974).
53. McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,
Ill N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970). See Teller v. McCoy, No. CC900 (W. Va. Feb. 21,
1979), in which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted a modified fair market
value theory. The court stated:
We feel that neither [the fair market theory nor the percentage reduction of use]
approach should be the exclusive mode of assessing damages in such cases. Of the two,
the "difference in value approach" (fair market value theory) is far more widely accepted
and we adopt it, in part, as the measure of damages in cases involving the breach of the
implied warranty of habitability. But, money damages so assessed, while appropriate in
the commercial cases, are inadequate in most residential landlord-tenant tenant [sic]
cases, since the residential tenant who endures a breach of the warranty of habitability
normally does not actually lose only money. The typical residential tenant rents a dwell-
ing for shelter, not profit. When the warranty is breached, he loses, instead, such in-
tangibles as the ability to take a bath or use hot water as frequently as he would like, he
may be forced to worry about the health of his children endangered by rats, roaches, or
other undesirable pests, or he may be denied the use of certain rooms in the apartment
because there is odor, severe water leakage, or no heat ....
[W]e hold that when the warranty of habitability is breached, the tenant's dam-
ages are measured by the difference between the fair market value of the premises if they
had been as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they were during the
occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe and unsanitary condition. However, the tenant
may additionally recover damages for annoyance and inconvenience proven to have re-
sulted from the breach.
id. at 31-32.
54. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
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operation virtually immunizes a landlord from damages necessary to
enforce the implied warranty and compensate the tenant.
In implied warranty of habitability cases, the market value theory
would determine the amount of damages by subtracting the fair rental
value of the premises in their defective condition from the contract
rent.55 Fair rental value generally is determined by use of a survey
method.56 In condemnation proceedings, where the fair market value
theory is used as the measure of damages, the fair rental value of the
property is commonly derived from a survey of the rentals for compa-
rable property in the vicinity at or about the time of taking. This value
establishes the "going rents" in the vicinity and inferentially what the
lessee could expect to receive upon the assignment of the lease. 57 By
analogy, the fair rental value of premises in implied warranty of habit-
ability cases would be determined by a survey of the rental rate of other
comparable deteriorated housing in the same vicinity.
Prior to the adoption of the warranty of habitability in Illinois,
enforcement of effective code compliance was limited due to the ine-
quality of bargaining position of landlord and tenant. 58 This inequality
arose from a market structure in which an inelastic demand for habita-
ble premises far exceeded the supply.59 By adopting the warranty of
habitability, the Supreme Court of Illinois established minimum stand-
ards of habitability for all residential rental property and held that
landlords who failed to comply with this standard were subject to dam-
ages.60 The tenant who had been forced to bargain for and live in dete-
riorated housing was to be compensated by damages for breach of the
landlord's warranty.
Landlords who continue to rent substandard housing in violation
of the implied warranty of habitability, in effect, have created an illegal
55. See note 47 supra and note 65 infra for cases applying the market value theory.
56. J. Horgen & W. Edgar, Leasehold Valuation Problems in Eminent Domain, 4 S.F.L. Rev.
1, 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Horgen & Edgar].
57. Id. Fair rental value also may be established by use of the income capitalization method.
However, this approach also would require a survey of comparable properties to determine the
market value and the expected rate of return for such properties. (This method generally is uti-
lized in commercial income-producing properties.) Hence, income capitalization is subject to the
same criticism as the survey method. See text accompanying notes 58-64 infra.
58. "The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well docu-
mented. Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing . ...
[L]andlords place tenants in a take it or leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of
adequate housing further increases the landlord's bargaining power .... " Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (Footnotes omit-
ted).
59. Id.
60. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 359, 280 N.E.2d 208, 213 (1972).
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"black market" 6' in deteriorated housing. Utilization of the fair mar-
ket value theory reinforces and perpetuates this "black market." Exist-
ence of the implied warranty of habitability has not altered the fact that
there continues to be a shortage of habitable housing.62  In this over-
crowded market, tenants are forced to pay high rents for uninhabitable
housing. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most eviction
cases involving warranty defenses concern residences in poor neighbor-
hoods63 where deteriorated housing is concentrated.
Under these circumstances, a survey of the rents charged for simi-
lar units in deteriorated condition in the same vicinity would demon-
strate that the average rental charge for surveyed units (the "going
rents" or "fair rental value") closely approximated the contract rent of
the tenant alleging the breach. Application of the fair market value
theory frequently would result in the anomaly that a tenant who had
proved breach of the warranty of habitability would be denied recovery
in damages because the contract rent was equal to the rent other land-
lords received for their nearby deteriorated housing.
The anomalous and undesirable result of the fair market value
theory in operation arises from its fundamental factual misconception
of the rental housing structure in overcrowded, decaying urban areas.
The premise of the theory is that a willing lessee will bargain and pay a
willing lessor, in a voluntary transaction, for the right to use and oc-
cupy the premises.64 In fact, there is no "fair market" for housing in
61. 84 HARV. L. REV. 729 (1971). The author states:
[lit seems questionable whether in assessing damages in this situation cognizance should
be taken of a 'fair' market value of noncomplying housino - such a market could be
regarded as an illegal 'black market' existing only by violation of law. Landlords should
not be allowed to benefit from the high prices which tenants may be willing to pay for
housing maintained in violation of law.
Id at 737.
62. For example, the City of Chicago, in its May 1976 Housing Assistance Plan filed as part
of the Community Development Block Grant application, stated that "approximately 121,200
units or 10.9% of the total [dwelling units in the City] are in need of such extensive repair that they
must be considered dilapidated or substandard." The Annual Housing Survey.- 1975, Table B2,
prepared by the Bureau of the Census and Office of Policy Development and Research of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, stated that 163,100 renter-occupied dwelling
units (27 percent of all renter-occupied dwelling units) had structural deficiencies.
An additional measure of the inability of tenants to find decent affordable housing can be
seen in the following: 43 percent of all renters and 53 percent of all black renters are paying more
than 25 percent of their income for rent. Annual Housing Survey.- 1975, Tables B-2, B-6.
63. Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, at Appendix 7-8, 30-34. The file study of contested
and randomly selected cases indicated that evictions tend to occur most often in geographical
areas where income levels are low and where high concentrations of minority social groups reside.
64. Korzen v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Ill. 2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 568 (1967). The inapplicabil-
ity of the "willing lessor and lessee" assumption to the residential premises market flows directly
from the different value to the lessee of leasehold premises in the commercial and residential
markets. In commercial leaseholds, the premises are a capital investment from which the lessee
expects a monetary return. Such leaseholds have an economic value to the tenant. In contrast, the
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these areas because the model of a voluntary, bargained-for transaction
between a willing lessee and a willing lessor-the characteristic of a
true market-is a fiction. Rather, the tenant has no real alternative but
to rent whatever premises are available, irrespective of the conditions,
at whatever rent is demanded. The result of the fiction employed by
the fair market value theory, then, is an artifically inflated "going rent"
which potentially reduces a tenant's damages to zero. Adoption of the
fair market theory in Illinois, which would minimize any real economic
sanction for the landlord's failure to maintain habitable premises,
would accordingly subvert the purpose of the implied warranty of hab-
itability.
The Market Value Theory Requirement of Expert Testimony
Eviscerates the Effectiveness of Warranty of Habitability
Most courts that have adopted the market value theory of damages
for breach of warranty of habitability have concluded that the value of
the premises as warranteed is the contract rent.65 Use of the fair mar-
ket value theory requires that the court establish the fair rental value of
the premises in their defective condition, 66 the proof of which would
seem to require expert testimony under Illinois law.
Because Illinois courts have required expert testimony as to fair
rental value in condemnation proceedings,67 it is logical to assume that
expert testimony would be required in warranty of habitability cases
applying the market value theory. The average tenant presumably
would fail to qualify as an expert witness to testify as to value.68 There-
fore, in order to receive more than nominal damages, the tenant might
residential lessee does not lease the premises with the expectation of an economic return. The
value of residential premises to the tenant is its use as a dwelling unit, a social rather than eco-
nomic value. See also note 52 supra.
65. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, Il1 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919, 926 (1972). One court
has indicated that the contract rent is evidence of the value of the premises as warranteed. Boston
Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (Mass. App. 1973).
66. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
67. See Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Blackberry Union Cemetery, 32 Ill. App. 3d
62, 335 N.E.2d 577 (1975). The Illinois appellate court explained that the proper measure of
damages to be awarded to a leaseholder of property subject to condemnation is the fair market
value of the leasehold interest minus the actual rent paid. The court then rejected as incompetent
the lessee's testimony as to the fair market value of the leasehold, basing the ruling, in part, on its
finding that the lessee "was in no way qualified as an expert." Id. at 65, 335 N.E.2d at 580.
68. The general rule regarding competency of persons to testify as to the value of real prop-
erty was announced by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v.
Oberlaender, 42 Ill. 2d 410, 247 N.E.2d 888 (1969), a condemnation action:
It is recognized in Illinois that any person acquainted with a particular property may
testify as to its value even though he is not engaged in the buying and selling of similar
properties in that locality. A witness is competent to testify as to the value of real prop-
erty if it appears that he has some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct
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be required to provide expert testimony. The cost of providing the ex-
pert witness would be prohibitive, of course, in light of the generally
small amounts of money at issue in warranty of habitability cases and
the high incidence of low income tenants involved in eviction actions.69
In Steinberg v. Carreras,70 a New York court recognized that "[tihe
economic realities of proceedings involving residential tenants make it
unlikely that such testimony would be readily available to tenants in
the usual cases."' 7 1 Several courts that have addressed the question of
expert witnesses under the fair market value theory have rejected this
theory as a measure of damages partly because of the prohibitive ex-
pense of expert testimony. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,72 a New
Jersey court stated: "Certainly, if tenant were required to bear the cost
of producing an expert witness, the effectiveness of the relief. . . would
be diminished. '73
judgment as to the value of the land in question beyond what is presumed to be pos-
sessed by men generally.
Id. at 414, 247 N.E.2d at 891 (citations omitted).
69. Judgment Landlord, supra note 8, at Appendix A-30, 31.
70. 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357
N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974).
71. Id. at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 144. The New York Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
award of damages based on the tenant's testimony of the condition of the premises for "lack of
adequate proof of the reduced value of the apartments." Steinberg v. Carreras, 77 Misc. 2d 774,
357 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (1974). N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW, § 235-b (McKinney 1975) created a war-
ranty of habitability in all residential leases. The combination of the Supreme Court ruling in the
Steinberg case and section 235-b produced odd results. At least two New York City Civil Court
judges felt constrained to award only nominal damages in light of Steinberg, where there is no
expert testimony regarding value and the tenant's testimony is limited to the condition of the
premises. Popach v. D'Aguilar, 173 N.Y.L.J. No. 103, p. I (N.Y. City Housing Ct. 1975) (Leder-
man, J.); Jeremias v. Amoroso, 173 N.Y.L.J. No. 99, p.1 9 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1975) (Lederman, J.);
Groner v. Lakeview Mgt. Corp., 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1975) (Blyn, J.). Accord,
Kekllas v. Saddy, 389 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1976). Contra, B.L.H. Realty Corp. v. Cruz, 87 Misc. 2d 258,
383 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1975). See also Goldner v. Doknovitch, 88 Misc. 2d 88, 388 N.Y.S.2d 504
(1976) (nominal damages awarded where there is no testimony by tenant or any witness as to
reduced value). In response to this paradox, two New York courts have awarded punitive dam-
ages, which require no proof of amount, in an amount equal to the amount of rent claimed in the
complaint. Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goldbetter, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1975); Barasch v.
Goldbetter, 173 N.Y.L.J. No. 72, p. 17 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1975). While the remedy of punitive
damages certainly eliminates the tenant's proof problem, it would not suffice in those cases where
the landlord's breach is not the willful and wanton variety required. Moreover, as a matter of
legal principle, punitive damages are not a substitute for actual damages.
Judge Blyn accurately summarized the situation in Groner v. Lakeview Mgt. Corp., 83 Misc.
2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1975): "The decision by the Appellate Term (in Steinberg v. Carreras)
renders meaningless the opinion of this court that the claimant may sue in an affirmative manner
in a claim of breach of warranty of habitability for damages for such breach." Id. at 810.
In 1976, section 235-b was amended to eliminate the expert testimony requirement. Finally,
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, the same court that decided the
Steinberg case, upheld the validity of the 1976 amendment and dispensed with the expert testi-
mony rule. Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 62 App. Div. 2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1978).
72. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
73. Id. at 487, 268 A.2d at 562. See also Teller v. McCoy, No. CC900 (W. Va. Feb. 21, 1979)
84 HARV. L. REV. 729, 737 (1971).
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Even assuming that in an implied warranty of habitability case
expert testimony would be economically justified, or otherwise deemed
necessary, the probative value of such testimony is questionable. As
one commentator has remarked on the question of traditional lease-
hold valuation:
Establishing a valuation for a leasehold is one of the most difficult
and complicated problems that an expert appraiser is called upon to
solve. Even for the realtor who has been appraising real estate of all
kinds for many years it presents some of the most perplexing ques-
tions ever encountered in the valuation field.74
The valuation of substandard housing required in warranty of habita-
bility cases is similarly very perplexing and the probative value of ex-
pert testimony in this context is doubtful.75 Two courts that have
addressed the issue have rejected use of the market value theory partly
because of the inadequacy of expert testimony on the value of the de-
fective premises. 76
Percentage Reduction in Use Approach
In implied warranty cases, the injury suffered by the tenant is the
diminution in the right of use and enjoyment of the premises due to
their deteriorated condition. Consequently, a direct measure of the ac-
tual injury to the tenant is required. The percentage reduction in use
approach is more appropriate than the market value theory to measure
this diminution in value. 77
Percentage reduction of use may be defined as a reduction in the
rent by a percentage reflecting the diminution in the value of the use
and enjoyment of the leased premises due to the defective conditions.78
The trial court would determine the percentage by which the use and
enjoyment of the premises has been diminished by each violation, total
the percentages, and assess as damages the aggregate percentage figure
applied to the periodic rent for all rental periods in which the violations
existed. 79
74. S. MCMICHAEL, THE APPRAISAL JOURNAL 495 (Oct. 1947), cited in Horgen & Edgar,
supra note 56, at 2.
75. See text accompanying notes 52-64 supra.
76. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 11l N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970), the court
stated: "l am dubious that use of expert testimony could add to either accuracy or certainty." Id.
at 487, 268 A.2d at 562. And in Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1973),
rev'don other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974), the judge remarked: "I seriously
doubt that statistical information about the value of apartments operated in violation of law is
available in a form that permits meaningful expert testimony." Id. at 38, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
77. Contra, Moskovitz, supra note 31, at 1469-70.
78. McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass. App. 1977).
79. Id. at 553. The percentage reduction in use measure, though not new to the Illinois
courts, has not been explicitly accepted. In Fisher v. Holt, 52 Ill. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370
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In marked contrast to the market value theory, the basic premise
behind percentage reduction is uniquely adapted to warranty of habita-
bility cases. Damages under this method are directly related to the in-
jury suffered by the tenant living in deteriorated housing. The
percentage reduction in use approach also has the distinct advantage of
not requiring expert testimony to establish loss of value, 80 thereby
greatly simplifying the task of the court and relieving the tenant of an
undue burden.8' Testimony of the tenants as to not only the factual
existence of the violations but also the effect of their daily living pro-
vides the best evidence available to the court to guide its determination
of an award of damages. 82
However, application of the percentage reduction theory as a
measure of damages is inappropriate to breach of implied warranty of
habitability cases. While the theoretical basis of the percentage reduc-
tion theory is sound in that it attempts to measure the loss of use to the
tenant, the articulated methods of applying this theory as espoused in
particular cases 83 all appear deficient.
The clearest method of application was set forth by the court in
McKenna v. Begin,84 wherein each violation was assigned a percentage,
and the total reduction in rent was determined by the sum of the aggre-
gate defects. Each percentage was to be determined by consideration
of factors "including but not limited to the nature, duration and seri-
ousness of defects and whether they may endanger or impair the
health, safety or well being of the occupants." '85 This method of deter-
mining damages, if applied literally, creates serious problems. It re-
quires the trier of fact to affix artificial mathematical values, not easily
(1977) the tenant alleged that she had been damaged in the amount of $1,125.00, an amount equal
to 50 percent of her rent for each of the 18 months of her tenancy. The appellate court declined
the invitation to furnish guidelines as to the factors considered relevant to the amount of damages
(Appellant's Brief at 28) but reversed the dismissal of her counterclaim and remanded to the trial
court.
80. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, III N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556, 562 (1970). See also
McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Mass. App. 1977), in which the court indicated that t e
evidence already presented to the trial court, which did not include expert testimony as to the
tenant's loss of use, was sufficient for the computation of damages.
81. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970), the New
Jersey court held that there was no need for expert testimony. Id. at 487, 268 A.2d at 562. In
McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977), and Green v. Superior Court, KO Cal. 3d
616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974), both of which adopt the percentage reduction of use
theory, the testimony upon which the awards were based did not include expert testimony.
82. Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 62 App. Div. 2d 291, 404 N.YS. 2d 115 (1978).
83. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, I II N.J.
Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
84. 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977). See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
85. McKenna v. Begin, 325 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Mass. App. 1975).
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reduced to objective verification,8 6 for each defect as a preliminary step
in the determination of a dollar amount for damages. Moreover, as-
sessment of the impact of each defect standing alone fails to compen-
sate the tenant for the cumulative impact of all the defective
conditions.8 7
An alternative application of the same theory was presented in
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown.8 8 This approach assigned an arbitrary
percentage for the total impact of the defects, and was devoid of stand-
ards as to how this percentage is to be determined.8 9 The articulation
of standards for the determination of the percentage figure would elim-
inate the objections to the arbitrariness of this method. However, it
would not resolve the major problem of creating an artificial and un-
necessary preliminary step in the determination of a damage amount.
The percentage reduction theory is to be preferred over a market
value approach to determine damages for breach of warranty of habita-
bility. However, all the methods of application of this theory contain
the same critical flaw - the requirement that the trier of fact engage in
the unnecessary, cumbersome, and artificial process of assigning objec-
tively unverifiable percentages for the defects.
A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE: Loss OF USE TO THE TENANT
Because the real injury suffered by a tenant for breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability is the diminution in the healthful use and
86. See Moskovitz, supra note 3 1, at 1469. The lack of objective verification underlies Pro-
fessor Moskovitz's criticism of percentage reduction in use theory:
• . . [Ilt is highly questionable whether the percentage reduction of use approach can
ever result in a figure which is objectively justifiable, even as an estimate. Any real
attempt to prove percentage reduction in use must consider the time and floor space
affected by the defects, assuming this data is available from the tenant. But this is only
the beginning, for some weight must be attributed to each affected facility. If there is no
hot water in the bathroom, the tenant cannot use the bath, but he can use the sink some
of the time and the toilet all the time. Also, he may use the toilet more than the sink, the
sink more than the bath-all of which, it would seem, is crucial to determining the per-
centage reduction in use of the bathroom. Moreover, after this is decided, it must be
determined how much this reduces the use of the premises as a whole. Should this be
done according to the percentage of floor space taken up by the bathroom, even if the
tenant uses the bathroom more than other parts of the premises? (Is a storeroom or
closet in use even when the tenant is not there but his belongings are?) And this process
must be repeated for each defect. The problems with this analysis are obvious.
The questions posed seem unanswerable if viewed as calling for objectively verifia-
ble answers.
87. For example, electrical wiring defects resulting in loss of lights in an apartment would be
assigned a certain percentage loss factor. Similarly, the presence of rodents in the same apartment
also would be assigned a percentage loss factor, as would holes in the floors. However, the sum of
the percentage loss factors would not correspond to the virtual total loss of use of the apartment
due to dark, rat-infested rooms with holes in the floors, for tenants with young children.
88. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
89. See Moskovitz, supra note 31, at 1468-69.
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enjoyment of the premises due to their defective condition, 90 a theory
of damages based upon market value is a wholly inappropriate meas-
ure to make this determination. 9' The alternative percentage reduction
in use theory, while theoretically sound, presents difficult problems for
application because it requires the trier of fact to affix to the defects at
issue artificial mathematical values not easily reduced to objective
verification.92 Rather, the courts need a direct measure of the actual
injury the tenant has suffered 93 that would utilize traditional damage
theory. 94 The loss of use to the tenant theory makes this determination
of actual injury. This alternative has its theoretical roots in the percent-
age reduction of use cases, which have affirmed the principle that
damges should be based on the tenant's actual loss.95
The loss of use approach establishes as compensation for loss a
dollar figure that is readily ascertainable by the trier of fact by applying
existing contract principles. This approach may be defined as a meas-
ure of damages reflecting the tenant's loss of use and enjoyment of the
leased premises due to the lessened habitability of the premises caused
by defective conditions in the building.96 The sum representing this
loss of use is to be determined by considering the nature and severity of
the defects, their duration, their effect on safety, health and sanitation,
and how they interfered with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the
premises.97
The loss of use theory assesses, within existing contract doctrine,98
compensation for the difference between what the tenant contracted for
90. See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 52-64 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
93. Actual injury to the tenant should be considered rather than an approach based upon
injuries to the realty itself. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
95. See, e.g., McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977), wherein the court stated,
"We believe that the damages should have been calculated in a manner which more closely re-
flects the diminution in the value of McKenna's use and enjoyment of the premises." Id. at 552.
96. Conditions which have any effect on health, safety, sanitation or well-being which con-
tribute to the tenant's loss of use give rise to damages. These conditions are not limited to viola-
tions of the building code. See note 22 supra.
97. The tenant who has suffered from breach of warranty of habitability has lost the benefit
of full and peaceful enjoyment of his home. For instance, a tenant's ability to use and enjoy the
premises for which he has bargained diminish in an apartment where bathroom facilities do not
work, the heating system is inoperable, and plaster has chipped or fallen. The trier of fact must
consider the totality of the conditions in light of their nature, severity, duration, and effect on the
health, safety, and sanitation of the tenant, and determine their total impact on the tenant's use
and enjoyment of the premises in order to arrive at a viscerally fair damage amount.
98. The standard measure of damages for breach of contract is the amount which will com-
pensate the injured person for the loss which has been caused by the breach or which fulfillment
of the contract would have prevented. See Hirsch v. Bollmeier, 34 I11. App. 2d 203, 180 N.E.2d
521 (1962); 15 Ill. L. & Prac. § 145. See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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and what he actually got.99 Computing the damages due to loss of use
does involve some uncertainty. However, it is well settled in Illinois
that damages may be established on the basis of reasonable
probability,' °° and that recovery of damages may not be denied be-
cause the amount is difficult to prove.' 0 Moreover, utilization of the
loss of use theory is entirely consistent with universally accepted princi-
ples of evidence that allow proof of damage amounts without preci-
sion. 102 The loss of use theory also is consistent with a long line of
Illinois decisions awarding damages where the amount of damages was
far less certain than in breach of warranty of habitability cases.' 0 3
99. By entering into a lease agreement for residential premises in Illinois, a landlord con-
tracts to furnish the tenant with an apartment in habitable condition, which may be evaluated by
the degree of the landlord's compliance with applicable building codes. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 111. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972). The tenant-lessee, in turn, contracts for an interest
in full use and enjoyment of the dwelling. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, I I I N.J. Super. 477,
268 A.2d 556, 562 (1970); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977). The loss of use
theory presumes that the landlord contracted, in return for the agreed-upon rent, to provide a
habitable apartment which meets code specifications. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972). See note 21 supra. The value of the apartment in habitable condition must be
presumed to be fixed by the lease agreement as the rental amount. See Schiro v. Gould, 18 Il1. 2d
538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960).
100. Illinois Power Co. v. Champaign Asphalt Co., 19 111. App. 3d 74, 310 N.E.2d 463, 469
(1974).
101. Tri-County Grain Terminal Co. v. Swift & Co., 118 Il. App. 2d 313, 254 N.E.2d 311
(1969). See also 15 AM. JUR. Damages, § 23 (1938), which states:
[lI]t is now generally held that the uncertainty which prevents a recovery is uncertainty as
to the fact of the damage and not as to its amount and that where it is certain that
damage has resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude the right of
recovery. This view has been sustained where, from the nature of the case, the extent of
injury and the amount of damage are not capable of exact and accurate proof. Under
such circumstances all that can be required is that the evidence with such certainty as the
nature of the particular case may permit lay a foundation which will enable the trier of
fact to make a fair and reasonable estimate.
Id.
102. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 27 (1935) states:
There are various modifications of the rule of certainty. They enable the courts, while
holding up a high standard of certainty as an ideal, to avoid harsh applications of it.
Among them are: a) if the fact of damage is proved with certainty, the extent or amount
may be left to reasonable inference; . . . d) mathematical precision in fixing the exact
amount is not required; e) if the best evidence of the damage of which the situation
admits is furnished, this is sufficient.
1d. at 101. These principles have been cited with approval in various warranty of habitability
cases adopting the percentage reduction in use measure. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
639, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, II1 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974); McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548, 553
(Mass. App. 1977); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Ill N.J. Super 477, 268 A.2d 556, 561 (1970).
Cf. Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (1973) (citing 5
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1950 & Supp. 1971)); Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87
Misc. 2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (1976) (citing 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1950 & Supp.
1971)); Park West Mgt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 62 App. Div. 2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115, 119 (1978)
(citing 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020) (1950 & Supp. 1971)).
103. Chicago Consolidated Traction Co. v. Schritter, 222 Ill. 364, 78 N.E. 820 (1906) (mental
suffering); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961) (intentional infliction of emotional
harm). See also St. Louis, V., & T.H.R.R. Co. v. Halter, 82 Ill. 208 (1876) (evidence of noise,
smoke and jarring of earth admissable to show value of property where no evidence of sales of
similar property available).
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The determination of damages for loss of use requires an examina-
tion by the trier of fact of all existing conditions and their impact on the
use and enjoyment of the premises by the tenant,1°4 in order to deter-
mine how the tenant actually was damaged by these conditions. 0 5 In
making such a determination there is no fixed rule for recovery.
Rather, the amount awarded must be left to the sound discretion of the
trier of fact in view of the facts of a particular case.' 06 While no rigid
rules should govern the determination of damages here, guidelines for
application are necessary to assist the trier of fact in the exercise of its
discretion to arrive at a fair damage amount and to assist the court in
establishing an evidentiary record in such cases.
Factors to Consider in Determining Loss of Use
Loss of use should be determined by consideration of three factors:
(1) the nature and severity of the defects, (2) their duration, and (3)
their effect on the safety, health and well-being of the tenant. These
factors should be examined to determine the total effect on the tenant's
loss of use and enjoyment of the premises. 0 7
104. Utilization of a loss of use approach is not wholly without precedent in Illinois. It has
long been settled law in Illinois that the measure of damages for the owner of property who suffers
injury due to a nuisance is "the discomfort and the deprivation of the healthful use and comforts
of his home." Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 51111. 2d 143, 281 N.E.2d 323 (1972); Fairbank
Co. v. Nicolai, 167 11. 242, 47 N.E. 360 (1897). These nuisance cases involving temporary, contin-
uing injury have adopted the standard of "deprivation of the healthful use" of the premises as the
proper measure to determine how the tenant or landowner was actually damaged by the com-
plained-of conditions. See Wheat v. Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 23 I11. App. 2d 14, 319 N.E.2d
290 (1974). These cases also have rejected the market value theory as the measure of damages
because it does not reflect the actual loss suffered. Id.
Several courts in other jurisdictions have adopted this measure defacto by assigning a mone-
tary amount to indicate diminution of services and use of the premises. See Samuelson v. Qui-
nones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (1972); Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc.
2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1973),
rev'don other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 744, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc.
25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972); Derr v. Gangemi, No. 2310 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, June
21, 1974).
105. At least one commentator has advanced a traditional tort damage theory based upon
discomfort and annoyance as the proper measure of damages for breach of warranty. See Mos-
covitz, supra note 31. Such an approach is not foreclosed by prior decision in Illinois. See
Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 111. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976); Gula v. Gawel, 71 111. App. 2d 174,
218 N.E.2d 42 (1966). Both Gula and Dapkunas appear to support the theory that a cause of
action for tort damages exists in Illinois for building code violations that affect health and safety.
However, the issue of recovery in tort for breach of the implied warranty is beyond the scope of
this article. The proposal for damages advanced here is based upon the contractual remedy rather
than tort for breach of warranty, and is not limited to violations of the building code. Moreover, a
contractual analysis of breach of warranty is consistent with the threshold opinion of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Spring.
106. Wheat v. Freeman Coal Corp., 23 I11. App. 3d 14, 319 N.E.2d 290 (1974).
107. Warranty of habitability cases involve a two-step process of proof: (I) proof of breach,
and (2) proof of damages. See note 22 supra. Once breach has been established, some of the
evidentiary matter utilized to determine breach may be relied upon for the assessment of damages.
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The most important consideration in the determination of dam-
ages is the nature and severity of the conditions that gave rise to the
breach and the effect of these conditions on the tenant's use of the
premises. For example, the lack of heat during the winter imposes
greater loss on the tenant than does chipped plaster. Similarly, total
lack of heat affects a tenant's use more than inadequate heat. In exam-
ining the nature of the conditions that give rise to damages, the court
must be flexible, and should not limit its inquiry to conditions that are
themselves per se violations of the applicable building code. 0 8 Each
case must be governed by its own facts and the result must be fair and
just to the landlord as well as the tenant.'0 9 The ultimate determina-
tion lies with the trier of fact, giving different weight to conditions de-
pending on severity, nature, and habitability. "10
The period of time in which the conditions existed is another fac-
tor to be taken into account. Damages may be assessed for the entire
period of the tenancy"'I if the conditions existed at the outset. Recov-
ery for conditions arising after the inception of the lease may be had
from the time the conditions arose.1 12 It would certainly mitigate dam-
ages if the landlord made timely and diligent efforts to repair the condi-
tions. 11 3
The trier of fact also must determine the effect of these conditions
on health, safety, sanitation and well-being. 1 4 Corresponding weight
should be given to defects that have some demonstrable adverse effect
on the health, safety, sanitation or well-being of the tenant in affixing
108. See Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. App. 1973) (warranty
of habitability applied independent of existence of building code). As a means of illustration, the
following conditions, some of which are not violations of any code, have been found to give rise to
damages to the tenant in warranty cases: faulty electrical wiring, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.
3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 11i Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); rotten bathroom floor and defective door, Hin-
son v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); falling ceiling plaster, Berzito v.
Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); lack of bathtub and shower, Gillette v. Anderson, 4 I11.
App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972); inoperable air conditioner, Whitehouse Estates, Inc. v.
Thomson, 87 Misc. 2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976).
109. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
110. As stated by the Hawaii Supreme Court:
[A] wiring defect may pose an immediate fire hazard such that a tenant cannot
reasonably be expected to sleep on the premises. On the other hand, a wiring defect may
be in a single non-essential circuit which can be turned off at a circuit box until repaired
at some later time.
Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 463, 462 P.2d 482, 484 (1969).
111. Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Il. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
112. Jarrell v. Hartman, 48 I11. App. 3d 985, 363 N.E.2d 626 (1977).
113. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
114. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Acad-
emy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Morbeth Realty v. Velez, 73
Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973).
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dollar value for loss of use." t5 The total dollar amount awarded as
damages should reflect the totality of the tenant's loss of use and enjoy-
ment of the premises due to these conditions." 16
Evidentiary Considerations
The determination as to how the defective conditions affected the
tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises may be elicited by both
documentary and testimonial evidence. Testimonial evidence might
include the tenant's own testimony,' 17 or testimony from witnesses such
as neighbors, 118 disinterested third parties, 119 building or health depart-
ment inspectors, 120 or other expert witnesses. Documentary evidence to
be considered might include building and health department
records, 12 findings or pleadings from building code compliance pro-
ceedings, 22 photographs of the premises, 23 and the provisions of the
115. McKenna v. Begin, 362 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. App. 1977).
116. Furthermore, it should be noted that tenants may recover consequential damages, as well
as damages for loss of use, due to the breach of the warranty of habitability. Cf Hoffman v.
Monoco, 330 Ill. App. 98, 69 N.E.2d 718 (1946) (consequential damages due to breach of express
covenant); O'Donnell v. Rosenthal, 110 111. App. 225 (1903) (consequential damages due to breach
of express covenant).
117. Park West Mgt. v. Mitchell, 62 App. Div. 2d 291, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1978); Whitehouse
Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc. 2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976). The testimony of the tenant
as to how the conditions in the premises affected his use and enjoyment of the apartment is the
best evidence to establish breach and damages. The tenant is the person best able to describe how
the conditions have interfered with his and his family's daily peaceful enjoyment of the prem-
ises-for example, the existence of constant, annoying odors in the premises that prevent the ten-
ant from entertaining friends or remaining in the premises.
The Illinois courts have utilized testimony by the occupant of land as to loss of use and
enjoyment of premises due to conditions which constitute a nuisance to determine damages for
such nuisance. For example, in Wheat v. Freeman Coal Corp., 23 Il1. App. 3d 14, 319 N.E.2d 290
(1974), occupants of the land testified that coal dust and smoke from the defendant's mine were
"constant, heavy and annoying, prohibiting them from doing their work at home or from opening
their windows; that the dust interfered with their water supply and infected their food, clothing
and furniture"). Id. at 16, 319 N.E.2d at 293.
118. Testimony from neighbors familiar with the conditions has been a particularly effective
means of proof in nuisance proceedings. Id.
119. Id.
120. The testimony of a building or health department inspector who has inspected the prem-
ises is the best corroboration of tenant testimony for proving conditions which give rise to the
breach of warranty and damages.
121. Building inspection reports constitute prima facie evidence of code violations in adminis-
trative proceedings. See Chicago Municipal Code § 41-7. These reports have been accepted by at
least one Illinois appellate court as prima facie evidence of breach of warranty of habitability. See
Richardson v. Wilson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1977).
The Report of the Chicago Bar Association Special Committee on Forcible Detainer Court,
supra note 16, has further recommended that in warranty of habitability cases arising in eviction
court, "[pirocedures should be established to make available to the parties, at the cost of duplicat-
ing the records, the inspection reports of the Building Department of the City of Chicago on the
premises in question for the preceding 12-month period." Id. at 6.
122. Findings by a building code compliance court that violations existed during the tenancy
may be offered into evidence. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 13 (1977). If no findings have yet
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applicable building code itself.
CONCLUSION
The creation of an implied warranty of habitability in Illinois radi-
cally altered the common law doctrine of caveat emptor for residential
leases. The warranty doctrine established a tenant's right to habitable
housing and consequently inspired hopes for improved code enforce-
ment and decent housing. By providing for damages for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, the courts established a potentially
effective enforcement device to induce compliance with minimum
standards of habitability in residential properties. Although this rem-
edy has been recognized in Illinois since a 1972 Illinois Supreme Court
decision, and repeatedly affirmed in subsequent decisions, the Illinois
courts have failed to promulgate clear standards for the determination
of an award of damages for breach. This failure has rendered a poten-
tially effective remedy a virtual nullity in relief. Moreover, the gener-
ally unsympathetic treatment of tenants by the trial courts in warranty
of habitability cases has further diminished the effectiveness of the
remedy.
This article has proposed a measure of damages in implied war-
ranty of habitability cases that directly measures the tenant's loss of use
and enjoyment of the premises due to the defective conditions. The
proposal outlined above and the procedures advanced as standards for
the determination of damages for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability are intended as a model for trial application to the Illinois
courts. By considering the nature, duration, and effect of the conditions
on the safety, health and well-being of the tenant, and by assessing the
total impact of the defects on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the
premises, the court can arrive at an equitable damage award that ade-
quately compensates the tenant in accordance with recognized contract
principles.
been made in a compliance proceeding, the building department records used in preparation of
that case are admissable as official public records, or perhaps as business records.
123. Pictures of the premises showing the conditions or the existing defects on the premises are
admissable upon the laying of proper foundation. While photographs also will be helpful in es-
tablishing the breach, see note 22 supra, they are particularly helpful in assisting the factfinder's
assessment of the impact of the violations on the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises.

